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The Public Trust Doctrine—A Twenty-First Century Concept
by Michael C. Blumm*
The public trust, an ancient legal precept of public ownership of important natural resources,
has traditionally been moored to navigable waters.1 But the doctrine has been continuously evolving
since it was introduced to American law in the landmark case of Arnold v. Mundy.2 As explained in a
recent text, the public trust doctrine is “in motion,”3 a dynamic vehicle protecting both public access to
natural resources and to decisionmakers with the authority to allocate those resources.4 The doctrine’s
central purpose may be to serve as a vehicle to avoid monopolization of resources with important public
values.5
The evolution of the public trust doctrine was evident in mid-nineteenth century America, when
the Supreme Court refused to limit the scope of the federal navigation power to tidal waters, as had
been the case in England. In The Genesse Chief, the Court used the advent of steam power, which
opened up inland waterways to commercial navigation, as a reason to expand the scope of the
navigation power, noting that the United States had “thousands of miles of public navigable water, in
which there is no tide…[therefore,] the English standard of navigability does not fit the American
continent with its great rivers and lakes.”6 Thus, over a century-and-a-half ago, navigability—central to
the historic public trust doctrine, evolved from a coastal to an inland, upriver concept.
The public trust doctrine’s evolution proceeded apace in the twentieth century, both in terms of
its scope of applicability and its purposes. The navigability tether was gradually eroded, as numerous
courts adopted extended the scope of public rights to all waters suitable for recreation.7 The California
*Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. I thank David Allen and Surinder Singh, 3Ls, Lewis and Clark Law
School, for help with the footnotes.
1
See HARRISON C. DUNNING, 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, §§ 29-32 (ROBERT E. BECK ED., 1991).
2
Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L 1 (1821) (concluding that that the tidal waters of the Raritan River and the submerged
lands beneath were common property, and therefore a riparian owner who planted oysters in the riverbed
adjacent to his farm could not claim a private right to harvest the oysters).
3
DAVID C. SLADE, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN MOTION: EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE, 1997-2008 (2008), building on
Coastal States Organization, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK (1ST ED. 1990 & 2ND ED. 1997).
4
See Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A Modern View of the
Public Trust Doctrine, 19 Envtl. L. 573, 595 (1989) (contending that the overarching concern of the public trust
doctrine was access: access to protected resources and access to decisionmakers allocating those resources) .
5
Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherntly Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711
(1986) (explaining that public rights in roadways and waterways, like the public trust doctrine, fostered commerce
by producing returns of scale and eliminating dangers of privatization such as holdouts and monopolies).
6
The Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 457 (1851). The Court thus ratfied the rulings of state supreme
courts like the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Carson v. Blazer, 4 Am. Dec., 2 Binn. 475 (1810) (concluding that it
would be “highly unreasonable” to limit the scope of navigability to tidal waters). The navigable-in-fact rule
meant that, unlike in England, where inland riparian owners owned the submerged land, in America submerged
land beneath inland navigable waters was subject to a public easement of free navigation.
7

See, e.g., State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980) (concluding that a segment of the Mulberry River was
navigable because it was and it could be floated by canoes or flat-bottomed boats); Ark. River Rights Comm. v.
Echubby Lake Hunting Club, 126 S.W.3d 738, 744-45 (Ark. App. 2003) (determining that lakes and passageways
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Supreme Court specifically extended the public trust doctrine to include water rights and to nonnavigable waters affecting navigable waters.8 The Hawaiian Supreme Court not only agreed that the
doctrine burdened water rights, but extended its scope to groundwater.9 The New Jersey Supreme
Court showed that the doctrine could be amphibious,10 ruling that it applied to dry sand beaches.11 The
California Supreme Court ruled that the purposes of the public trust extended beyond the traditional
purposes of navigation and fishing to include recreation and ecological preservation.12 The expanded
purposes seemed only logical, as the fishing purpose would be undermined if the doctrine could not
protect fishable waters.
The evolution of the public trust doctrine has been remarkable,13 but it has been haphazard.
Some states have rich histories of public trust doctrine interpretations by their courts; some do not.
Some have entrenched the public trust constitutionally. Some have invoked the doctrine in their
statutes. But there has not been an enormous amount of learning from one jurisdiction to another. In
an effort to assist borrowing among jurisdictions, as well as organize what is a burgeoning area of the
law, Professor Mary Wood14 and I have begun to write a treatise on the Public Trust Doctrine. The

that were created because of flooding due to construction of a new dam on the Arkansas River were navigable
because the public had used and could use the body of water recreationally for boating and fishing); Parks v.
Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 840 (S.D. 2004) (acknowledging the state’s test for determining public use is discovering
whether water “[i]s capable of use by the public for public purposes” and that South Dakota legislation (§ 43-1721) defined public purposes to “include “boating, fishing, swimming, hunting, skating, picknicking and similar
recreational pursuits.”); DUNNING, supra note 1, § 32.03 (collecting state cases on the “pleasure boat” test for
navigability).
8
Natl. Audubon Socy. v. Sup. Ct. Alpine Co., 658 P.2d 709, 712, 727-30 (Cal. 1983). See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm &
Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 701 (1995) (examining
the legacy of the Mono Lake case in terms of the public trust doctrine’s origin, scope, and purpose; its effect in
making water rights non-vested and creating a continuous state supervisory duty; and on public standing).
9
In re Water Use Permit Application, 9 P.3d 409, 440-47, 450-52 (Hawaii 2000) (concluding that the public trust
doctrine is a fundamental principle of constitutional law in Hawaii and applies to all water resources without
exception or distinction because of explicit language found in Article XI §§ 1 and 7 of the state’s constitution;
therefore, the state has both the authority and the duty to maintain the flow and purity of the state’s water and
assure that the waters are put to reasonable and beneficial use).
10
Scott W. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is it Amphibious? 1 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 107 (1986).
11
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Assn., 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984) (ruling that the public trust doctrine
required that the public must be given both access to and use of a privately owned beach); see also Raleigh Ave.
Beach Assn. v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005) (holding that the public trust doctrine required that
beach owned by a private beach club be available to the public at a reasonable fee).
12
City of Berkeley v. Super. Ct., 606 P.2d 362, 365 (Cal. 1980).
13
The modern public trust doctrine is surely traceable to Professor Sax’s influential article published some thirty
years ago. Joseph Sax, The Public Trust in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev.
471 (1970); see also Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 19 Ecology L.Q. 351 (1989).
14
See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for
Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 Envtl. L. 43
(2009); Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for
Present and Future Generations (Part II): Instilling a Fiduciary Obligation in Governance, 39 Envtl. L. 91 (2009);
Mary Christina Wood, Nature’s Trust: Reclaiming an Environmental Discourse, 25 Va. Envtl. L.J. 242 (2007); Mary
Christina Wood, Nature’s Trust: A Legal, Political and Moral Frame for Global Warming, 34 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev.
576 (2007).
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treatise will survey the law of every jurisdiction,15 including numerous recent adoptions by foreign
nations.16 Our project aims not merely to collect the law but to help clarify the doctrine and encourage
its development by making it accessible to members of the bar whose practice is not necessarily
centered around environmental law.
We also seek to encourage scholarship on public trust law. In the last year, three of our
students produced sterling pieces of scholarship, two of which follow in this issue of this journal. Crystal
Chase challenges the received wisdom that the public trust doctrine is a exclusively a state doctrine.17
She closely examines several Supreme Court cases, particularly the lodestar Illinois Central Railroad
decision.18 Her conclusion is that the core of the public trust doctrine is federal, which means that states
are not free to renounce the doctrine, something a few states, captured by extractive interests,19 have
attempted.20 Crystal’s engaging argument may—and should—cause courts to rethink the origins of the
doctrine and to reject state attempts to relieve themselves of public trust obligations, since these
obligations are fundamental elements of sovereignty that cannot be relinquished.21
The second article, by Mackenzie Keith, surveys the part of the public trust doctrine that is
clearly amphibious: that is, above the high water mark, on dry land.22 Mackenzie examines the role of
the trust doctrine in state parklands and beaches, revealing a surprisingly vibrant legacy of the doctrine
upland of waterways. The future of the doctrine in the 21st century almost certainly will include an
expansion of its effects above the high water mark.

15

Valuable groundwork concerning eastern states was laid by Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the
Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classification of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 Penn St. L. Rev. 1
(2007).
16
See, e.g., M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu, 1999 S.C.C. 464, 506, 530 (India) (using the public trust
doctrine to interpret India’s constitutional right to life (Art. 21) and finding a violation of the public trust and right
to life when a government agency approved the destruction of a public park and market to build a shopping
complex); National Water Act 36 of 1998, 6 JSRSA 1-410 to -467 (2001) (S. Afr.) (abolishing the public/private
distinction in water rights and codifying water as a “resource common to all”).
17
Crystal S. Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and Federal Common Law: An Unconventional View, 14
Hastings W.-Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y ___ (2009).
18
Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
19
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) (describing how relatively
small, but concentrated interest groups have a disproportionate effect on legislation); Michael C. Blumm, Public
Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why “Multiple Use” Failed, 18 Harv. Envtl. L. 405 (1994) (applying public choice
theory lessons to public land managers’ decisionmaking).
20
Idaho Code § 58-1201(6) (1996); Arizona Ctr. for Law in Public Interest v. Hassel, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz App. 1991)
(interpreting the gift clause of the Arizona Constitution (Art. IX, § 7) to grant “judicial review of an attempted
legislative transfer of a portion of the public trust).” Id. at 170.
21
See Michael C. Blumm, Harrison C. Dunning & Scott W. Reed, Renouncing the Public Trust Doctrine: An
Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 Ecology L.Q. 461 (1997) (maintaining that an Idaho statute
could not abolish the pubic trust doctrine in the state).
22
Mackenzie Keith, Judicial Protection for Beaches and Parks: The Public Trust Doctrine Above the High Water
Mark, 14 Hastings W.-Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y ___ (2009).

3

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1468601
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1468601

A third article, published elsewhere,23 explores the incorporation of the public trust doctrine
into the recently enacted Great Lakes Compact.24 This incorporation may be emblematic of other
adoptions of the public trust in other pieces of legislation, or perhaps constitutions. A distinguishing
feature of the Great Lakes Compact, as pointed out by Bridget Donegan, may be the fact that the trust
doctrine established by it is separate from and in addition to the public trust that exists in the eight
Great Lakes Compact states.25
Professor Wood and I envision these articles as only the first wave of scholarship emanating
from our project. The public trust doctrine remains, in the 21st century, a largely mysterious doctrine,
with plenty of critics26 and numerous advocates.27 As old as Roman law,28 the public trust doctrine

23

Bridget Donegan, The Great Lakes Compact in Michigan and Wisconsin: Establishing a Distinct Public Trust
Doctrine, 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. ___ (forthcoming, 2009).
24
Act of Oct. 3, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-342, 122 Stat. 3739.
25
The eight Great Lakes Compact states are Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and Wisconsin.
26
See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 Duke
Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 1 (2007) (arguing the public trust doctrine lacks precedent in Roman and English law); Richard
Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax’s Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection,
and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1209 (1991) (contending that the public
trust doctrine is too weak a remedy for broad environmental ills); James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The
Public Trust in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 Envtl. L. 527 (1988) (claiming that the public trust doctrine has no
foundation in the police power or judicial review and concluding that modern judicial interpretations of the
doctrine are undemocratic); Randy T. Simmons, Propert and the Public Trust Doctrine, PERC Policy Series-39 (2007)
(discussing the potential threat the public trust doctrine poses to private property rights); Richard J. Lazarus,
Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71
Iowa L. Rev. 631 (1986) (maintaining that continued judicial reliance on the public trust doctrine may stifle the
evolution of natural resources law); James L. Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on the
Public Trust Writings of Professor Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning and Johnson, 63 Denver L. Rev. 565 (1986) (critiquing the
potential policy motives of leading public trust scholars).
27
See, e.g., Mary Turnipseed, Stephen E. Roady, Raphael Sagarin & Larry B. Crowder, The Silver Anniversary of the
United States’ Exclusive Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue
Water Public Trust Doctrine, 36 Ecology L.Q. 1 (2009) (calling for an expansion of the public trust doctrine to
federal fisheries management); Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and
Integrating Standards, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 699 (2006) (advocating an integrated approach to the public trust
doctrine that includes common law, statutory, and constitutional bases); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem
Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working Change From Within, 15 Southeastern Envtl. L.J. 223 (2006)
(arguing for the protection of natural capital and ecosystem services through the public trust doctrine); Richard
Roos-Collins, A Plan to Restore the Public Trust Uses of Rivers and Creeks, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1929 (2005) (calling for an
adoption of public trust principles in water rights regulation); Dale D. Goble, Three Cases / Four Tales: Commons,
Capture, the Public Trust, and Property in Land, 35 Envtl. L. 807 (2005) (explaining the origins and necessity of the
public trust doctrine through three early wildlife law cases); Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae,
and the Attorney General as the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 57 (2005)
(promoting a larger role for the public trust doctrine in contamination cleanups); William D. Araiza, Democracy,
Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a
Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 385 (1997) (identifying a foundation for the public trust doctrine
in many state constitutions); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 269 (1980) (examining the potential role for the public trust doctrine in judicial review of public land
management decisions).
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evolved to meet the felt necessities of the 19th and 20th centuries. We hope that our efforts—and those
of our students—help the doctrine continue to be relevant to imperatives of the 21st century.29

28

Institutes of Justinian, 2.1.1 (529 A.D.) (“By the law of nature, these things are common to humankind: the
Air, running Water, the Sea...”).
29
As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated in ruling that the public trust doctrine applied to beaches, “…[W]e
perceive the public trust doctrine not to be ‘fixed or static,’ but one to ‘be molded and extended to meet changing
conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.’” Mathews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A2d
355, 365 (N.J. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 821 (1984), quoting Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-theSea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972).
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